Written by: Mio Kanzaki(Security Analyst (AI))Reviewed by: 千葉圭介Updated
DMARC is a setting that tells the receiving side how to treat spoofed mail. The formal name is Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance. RFC 9989 describes it as a mechanism that lets the owner of a domain check how the domain is used, specify how mail that fails the check should be treated, and ask for reports of the results.
How does DMARC work?
Think of a handling manual handed to a reception desk. When the check against the list (SPF) and the seal (DKIM) turns up a suspicious parcel, DMARC is the sender's advance note on whether reception should let it through, keep it in a separate room, or refuse it. At the same time, the sender can ask for a later report on what kinds of parcels were handled how.
According to the preface of RFC 9989, unwanted mail often fakes the domain in the From field that the recipient sees. SPF and DKIM are not directly tied to the domain in that From field. DMARC builds on the two and checks them against the domain in the From field. The policy is published as a TXT record in DNS, at a name with _dmarc at its head.
There are two conditions to pass. Either SPF or DKIM passes, and in addition, the domain used in that authentication is "aligned" with the domain in the From field. Alignment comes in a relaxed form that allows domains of the same organization and a strict form that allows only exactly the same domain, and the owner chooses.
What decides how mail that fails is treated is the policy (p). None is a state in which the owner states no wish about treatment. Quarantine marks failing mail as suspicious. Reject is a strong designation that treats use of the domain as improper.
The order of settings is also set out in email authentication flaws. Public DNS records are part of what the free URL check can read from the outside.
Why does DMARC matter?
If fake mail claiming your own domain reaches business partners and customers, it harms trust. The recipients believe the sender they see is right, and go on to check an invoice or type a password. Preparation against phishing as a whole is gathered in phishing countermeasures.
Introduce it step by step. RFC 9989 sets out the owner's actions in order. First, publish SPF for the domains used to send, and attach DKIM signatures at the senders.
Next, prepare an address to receive aggregate reports, and publish the policy. After that, collect and analyze the reports, and fix the mail flows that are not aligned. Last, decide whether to move to a stronger policy. For help going through those steps, contact us.
A DMARC pass means only that use of the domain in the From field was confirmed as permitted. RFC 9989 does not say it guarantees that the content of the mail is safe. Strengthen the policy only after the reports have shown you all the senders.
Related terms
- SPF: a setting that declares which servers may send mail for the domain
- DKIM: a setting that adds a digital signature to email so tampering can be checked
- SPF/DKIM/DMARC: the whole picture of anti-spoofing that combines the three
- Email spoofing: the act of sending mail with a false sender
Frequently asked questions
May I set the DMARC policy to reject from the start?
It is not the recommended way. RFC 9989 sets out an order: collect and analyze reports, fix the senders that cannot be authenticated, and only then decide whether to move to a strong policy. If you set reject while some senders remain unlisted, even genuine mail may be refused.
If mail passes DMARC, can it be called safe?
No. RFC 9989 says a DMARC pass shows only that use of the domain in the From field has been confirmed as permitted by its owner, and is not a guarantee that the mail is safe to deliver to the inbox.
Next step
The first step is to list the services that send your mail. The following steps are in email authentication flaws, and preparation against phishing is in phishing countermeasures. The free URL check reads public information from the outside, and for planning the rollout of your policy, contact us.
Frequently asked questions
May I set the DMARC policy to reject from the start?
It is not the recommended way. RFC 9989 sets out an order: collect and analyze reports, fix the senders that cannot be authenticated, and only then decide whether to move to a strong policy. If you set reject while some senders remain unlisted, even genuine mail may be refused.
If mail passes DMARC, can it be called safe?
No. RFC 9989 says a DMARC pass shows only that use of the domain in the From field has been confirmed as permitted by its owner, and is not a guarantee that the mail is safe to deliver to the inbox.