Written by: Mio Kanzaki(Security Analyst (AI))Reviewed by: 千葉圭介Updated
Security for local governments and public bodies means keeping resident data, and the public sites and application forms that residents use, from leaking, being altered or stopping. It is for prefectures, cities, wards, towns and villages, local independent administrative corporations, affiliated bodies and the contractors that build their sites. The danger is not only systems inside the office but also outside web production services and domain settings no longer used, and the first step is to list the sites and domains you publish.
This page is written so that staff in information policy and general affairs can decide what to protect and where an assessment fits. What we take on is assessing and fixing websites and externally exposed systems. The inside of the office network is not included.
What data do local governments and public bodies need to protect?
Local governments hold two kinds of information: resident information handled in systems inside the office, such as the resident register, taxes and welfare, and information received from residents through public sites. The latter includes enquiry forms, application forms for events and health checks, and registration for disaster mail.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) guideline divides local government information systems by network nature into three: the My Number use system, the LGWAN-connected system (a dedicated administrative network linking local governments) and the internet-connected system. The internet-connected system covers internet mail and the website management system. Our assessments mainly target this side, visible from outside.
Even small amounts of information on a public site are worth protecting
Information entered in an application form on a public site can be sensitive even if the count is small. As the cases below show, a smoking-cessation application form held names and addresses, and also the state of medication and hospital visits and medical history.
A public site can also be used as a stepping stone to spread false information. If a fake contact detail or a fake application page is posted in a disaster or benefit notice, residents suffer directly. A public site is a place for showing things and, at once, a place that holds residents' trust.
What routes did actual local government incidents take?
We list only cases the local governments themselves published. What they share is that the incident happened not on the local government's own site but on the web production service that a contractor used.
Nagoya City: unauthorized access to a web production service used by a contractor
Nagoya City announced this on 21 October 2026. There was unauthorized access by a third party to the cloud environment of the company that runs the web production service a smoking-cessation project contractor used for its application form. Applications ran from 14 July 2025 to 31 August 2026, and the count affected is 886.
Information that may have leaked is name, sex, date of birth, phone number, email address, postal code and address. It also includes history of use of cessation aids, smoking status, medication, hospital visits, medical history, allergies and whether pregnant. The contractor sent a letter of apology and caution to the registered email addresses of those affected. The city says it instructed the contractor to strengthen its information security structure.
Fukuoka City: a project form affected by an incident at the same company
Fukuoka City announced this on 16 October 2026: unauthorized access by a third party was confirmed at the company that runs a web production service used in a city project. According to the city's document, on 13 October 2026 the company confirmed a state in which data in its cloud environment could be obtained from outside (30 September to 1 October), and it fixed the flaw on 14 October.
Names and email addresses of 42 people registered on the website of the city's start-up support programme may have leaked. The city says it has not confirmed any outflow at present and will caution those registered.
The two cases stem from an incident in the same operator's cloud environment. Even if the local government and its contractor are careful, an incident can occur on the side of an outside service they use. So you need to know for yourselves the list of services you use and the types of information you put into them. For similar cases in education, see school security.
What does the MIC guideline ask of local governments?
It is titled "Guidelines on Information Security Policy for Local Governments". MIC formulated it on 30 March Heisei 13 (2001), and the latest version was revised on 27 March Reiwa 8 (2026). On the MIC publication we checked (on 18 November 2026), this March Reiwa 8 edition is the latest.
The guideline is a reference for local governments creating or reviewing an information security policy (a document of the organisation's policy and measures). Its sample text assumes the executive departments of a city. Assemblies, committees and local independent administrative corporations are to read it with the wording adapted.
What changed in the March Reiwa 8 revision
The key points of the revision can be confirmed in one MIC sheet. The four points are these.
- Because the amended Local Autonomy Act of Reiwa 6 led to a draft minister's guideline, overlapping provisions were deleted.
- For disposing of storage media that hold resident information, methods other than physical destruction were added, and the range in which staff attend data erasure was made clear.
- Use of USB memory and similar devices was aligned with the guideline for government bodies, with missing measures added.
- In light of the guideline for the standard for government bodies' measures (partly revised September Reiwa 7), descriptions of attacks that abuse DNS settings were added.
The last item bears directly on staff who run websites. If DNS (the mechanism that ties domain names to servers) settings are left in place, a third party may use them.
Provisions that concern public sites
The guideline's commentary has concrete provisions on public sites. The main points we confirmed in the original are these.
- A website published to the outside must use a domain name ending in ".lg.jp", even when its building is outsourced and wherever the platform sits, and the procurement specification must say so.
- For a site published on the internet, it is desirable to encrypt all information (TLS at all times) to prevent eavesdropping and tampering.
- When ending a site published on hosting or a CDN (an outside mechanism that speeds delivery), the DNS settings of the domain you set up must be deleted promptly. The contract should make clear whether the local government or the contractor does the deletion, and the local government confirms it was done.
- For email spoofing, it says sender domain authentication technology must be adopted.
- For building web applications safely, it points to IPA's "How to Create a Secure Website" (7th revised edition).
An attack that abuses leftover domain settings is called subdomain takeover (a third party taking over domain settings tied to a service you no longer use). The guideline's commentary also warns about this attack.
Relationship to the government standard
For national bodies there is a set of unified standards for government bodies' cybersecurity measures. It does not apply to local governments as it stands, but the MIC guideline aligns with the government's revisions. The March Reiwa 8 edition also reviewed its text by citing the guideline for drawing up measure standards for government bodies (Reiwa 7 edition, partly revised 5 September Reiwa 7, National Cybersecurity Office, Cabinet Secretariat).
Which assessments suit a local government or public body?
The combination depends on how the public site is built and how you use outside services. Prices below begin at the amounts shown, and the formal quotation comes after the free assessment.
| Situation | Suggested assessment | Guide price (excl. tax) |
|---|---|---|
| You want to confirm from outside the versions of public servers, open entrances and encryption of communication | Server and network assessment | from JPY 49,800 (up to 5 IPs) |
| You run the local government site or a special site on a CMS such as WordPress | WordPress/CMS site assessment | from JPY 49,800 (up to 30 pages) |
| You publish a system with login or input, such as applications, bookings or electronic filing | Web application assessment Lite or Standard | Lite from JPY 98,000 (up to 10 screens), Standard from JPY 198,000 (up to 20 screens, including screens behind login) |
Page count, login-protected screens and paid plugins drive the price. A tool scan and a person's review make up each assessment, with a report at the end and one free re-assessment after fixes.
Fixes and monitoring after an assessment
Holes found can be repaired by us. Individual vulnerability fixes begin at JPY 10,000 (excl. tax) and recovery from tampering or malware at JPY 29,800 (excl. tax). Monthly updates are covered by Maintenance Lite at JPY 9,800 per month (excl. tax).
Before delivery we send each fix as a PDF, and hand over only after you have checked the real screens. Support is free for one month afterwards.
Start with the free URL check to see what your domains and public sites show to anyone outside, at no cost. To plan the next step, contact us.
What holes does an assessment of a public site look at?
Overlaying the guideline's provisions on the published cases gives six holes to check first on a public site. Of these, the versions of public servers, entrances and the state of encryption are checked in the server and network assessment. Whether DNS setting flaws, sender domain authentication and subdomain takeover fall inside the assessment range is confirmed through a consultation for each project.
| Hole to check | How it appears at a local government | Page to read |
|---|---|---|
| DNS misconfiguration | DNS settings for a service no longer used remain, undeleted | DNS misconfiguration |
| No sender domain authentication | Fake mail using the local government's name reaches residents and businesses | Missing sender domain authentication |
| Subdomain takeover | The domain of a special site that has ended is used by a third party to publish | Subdomain takeover |
| Cloud public setting mistakes | A place holding application documents or meeting materials can be seen by anyone who knows the URL | Cloud storage public setting mistakes |
| Security misconfiguration | Unneeded files or admin screens are visible from outside | Security misconfiguration |
| Software not updated | The CMS or server parts have gone long without updates | Unpatched software |
Entrances to related measures are supply chain attack measures and phishing measures. For how sender domain authentication works, see the SPF, DKIM and DMARC glossary page.
What we take on, and what we do not
Our scope is websites and externally exposed systems: assessing them, fixing what we find, investigating and recovering after damage, and helping draft reports. An NDA and an assessment consent form come before any assessment.
Equally clearly, the inside of resident information systems within the office, and LGWAN-connected and My Number use networks, are outside our scope. Reports to the Personal Information Protection Commission and notices to residents are the local government's own procedures, not ours to file; we can help organise the facts and prepare the documents.
If a contractor's cloud service falls within the assessment, besides the local government's consent we need the permission of that service's provider. Any part for which provider permission cannot be obtained is left out of the assessment.
Whether we can take part in a bid or procurement is decided by each project's specification and conditions. This page does not state it either way. An assessment tests for holes that are known today. It cannot guarantee future safety, and we do not claim it always prevents harm.
Frequently asked questions about local government security
Can you assess only our local government's public site?
Yes. We assess websites and externally exposed systems visible from the internet. The inside of the resident information systems within the office is not included. Before an assessment we receive a non-disclosure agreement and an assessment consent form, and where a contractor's service is involved we also confirm that provider's permission.
Does the MIC guideline apply to affiliated bodies?
The guideline is for local governments, and assemblies, committees and local independent administrative corporations are to read its wording as applicable to them. As far as we confirmed, it does not mention affiliated bodies. Ask the information security staff of the local government that supervises you whether it applies.
Can you take part in bidding or procurement?
Whether we can take part is decided by each project's specification and conditions. This page does not state it either way. We tell you the assessment scope, price guide and report format through a consultation, so talk to us about the material your procurement section needs.
How much does it cost to assess a public site?
The server and network assessment and the WordPress/CMS site assessment both start from JPY 49,800 (excl. tax), covering up to 5 IPs and up to 30 pages respectively.
Web application assessment Lite starts from JPY 98,000 (excl. tax, up to 10 screens). Pages, login-protected screens and paid plugins vary the price, and the formal quotation is issued after the free assessment.
Next step
Two things this week. First, list the sites and domains your local government publishes, and the web production services and forms your contractors use. Second, start an inventory of the domains and DNS settings of sites that have ended, and use the free URL check to see the current state of your public sites.
To talk about the assessment scope including contractors, or the form of material your procurement needs, contact us. Other industries are listed under security by industry.
Written by Mio Kanzaki (AI security analyst). Supervised by 千葉圭介. Updated 18 November 2026.
Frequently asked questions
Can you assess only our local government's public site?
Yes. We assess websites and externally exposed systems visible from the internet. The inside of the resident information systems within the office is not included. Before an assessment we receive a non-disclosure agreement and an assessment consent form, and where a contractor's service is involved we also confirm that provider's permission.
Does the MIC guideline apply to affiliated bodies?
The guideline is for local governments, and assemblies, committees and local independent administrative corporations are to read its wording as applicable to them. As far as we confirmed, it does not mention affiliated bodies. Ask the information security staff of the local government that supervises you whether it applies.
Can you take part in bidding or procurement?
Whether we can take part is decided by each project's specification and conditions. This page does not state it either way. We tell you the assessment scope, price guide and report format through a consultation, so talk to us about the material your procurement section needs.
How much does it cost to assess a public site?
The server and network assessment and the WordPress/CMS site assessment both start from JPY 49,800 (excl. tax), covering up to 5 IPs and up to 30 pages respectively. Web application assessment Lite starts from JPY 98,000 (excl. tax, up to 10 screens). Pages, login-protected screens and paid plugins vary the price, and the formal quotation is issued after the free assessment.